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Abstract 
Acquisition programs increasingly use model-centric approaches, generating 
and using digital assets throughout the lifecycle. Recent research supports new 
model-centric practices, yet in spite of sound practices there are uncertainties that 
may impact programs over time. The emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget 
cuts, disruptive technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related 
programmatic decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to 
cascading vulnerabilities within model-centric acquisition programs, potentially 
jeopardizing program success. The research objectives included: (1) investigate 
uncertainties and related decisions that may lead to potential vulnerabilities in model-
centric acquisition programs; (2) generate a CEM model for aiding program 
managers in detecting and assessing vulnerabilities related to the program’s model-
centric practices and environment; and (3) define a step-wise process for applying 
the generic model in assessing and mitigating model-centric vulnerabilities.      
This research seeks to provide program managers with the means to identify 
model-centric program vulnerabilities and determine where interventions can most 
effectively be taken.   The technical approach for the research began with literature 
review and gathering results of past research studies of relevance, including studies 
of model-centric environments and transformations from traditional to model-centric 
engineering paradigm (sometimes referred to as the digital engineering paradigm), 
recent workshop findings, and related work on vulnerability assessment that may 
have implications for this work. Cause-Effect Mapping, a technique developed at MIT, 
was employed to examine cascading effects between emerging uncertainties and 
terminal outcomes. Using the results, a CEM was generated and used for discussion 
with subject matter experts, and information on uncertainties and leading indicators 
was collected. Analysis was performed to consider the cascading vulnerabilities and 
potential intervention options. The results were used to refine the CEM and analytic 
approach to develop a generic model for vulnerability assessment of model-centric 
programs. Usability of the resulting model was tested with selected research 
stakeholders. Several analytic approaches were investigated.  
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This research aims to contribute a useful approach for assessing, detecting 
and mitigating vulnerabilities in acquisition programs, specifically related to the use of 
model-centric practices and environments. The approach is compatible with existing 
DoD vulnerability assessment practices and frameworks. Research results are 
empirically-grounded vulnerabilities of model-centric programs, a Reference CEM for 
identifying vulnerabilities and interventions, and a step-wise process that program 
managers can apply on their programs using the CEM to assess, prioritize, and 
mitigate model-centric vulnerabilities.   
Keywords: model-centric program, vulnerabilities, cause-effect mapping, 
acquisition, interventions 
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Executive Summary 
This report describes recent research in support of acquisition programs facing 
challenges in transforming to model-centric engineering. Acquisition programs 
increasingly use model-centric approaches, generating and using digital assets 
throughout the lifecycle. Recent research supports new model-centric practices, yet 
in spite of sound practices there are uncertainties that may impact programs over 
time. The emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive 
technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic 
decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to cascading 
vulnerabilities within model-centric acquisition programs, potentially jeopardizing 
program success. The research objectives included: (1) investigate uncertainties 
and related decisions that may lead to potential vulnerabilities in model-centric 
acquisition programs; (2) generate a generic model for aiding program managers in 
detecting and assessing vulnerabilities as related to the program’s model-centric 
practices and environment; and (3) define a step-wise process for applying the 
generic model in assessing and mitigating model-centric vulnerabilities.   
This research seeks to provide program managers with the means to identify model-
centric program vulnerabilities and determine where interventions can most 
effectively be taken.   The technical approach for the research began with literature 
review and gathering results of past research studies of relevance, including studies 
of model-centric environments and transformations from traditional to model-centric 
engineering paradigm (sometimes referred to as the digital engineering paradigm), 
recent workshop findings, and related work on vulnerability assessment that may 
have implications for this work. Cause-Effect Mapping, a technique developed at 
MIT, was employed to examine cascading effects between emerging uncertainties 
and terminal outcomes. Using the results, a CEM was generated and used for 
discussion with subject matter experts, and information on uncertainties and leading 
indicators was  collected. Analysis was performed to consider the cascading 
vulnerabilities and potential intervention options. The results were used to refine the 
CEM and analytic approach to develop a generic model for vulnerability assessment 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 2 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
of model-centric programs. Usability of the resulting model was tested with selected 
research stakeholders.  Several analytic approaches were investigated. 
This research aims to contribute a useful approach for assessing, detecting and 
mitigating vulnerabilities in acquisition programs, specifically related to the use of 
model-centric practices and environments. The approach is compatible with existing 
DoD vulnerability assessment practices and frameworks. Anticipated results are 
empirically-grounded vulnerabilities of model-centric programs and a CEM generic 
model for identifying vulnerabilities and interventions.  The research outcome is a 
step-wise process that program managers can apply on their programs using the 
generic model to assess, prioritize and mitigate model-centric vulnerabilities.  
The research resulted in two published papers for 2018 Naval Postgraduate School 
Acquisition Research Symposium, one presented in a panel session and the other 
as a poster paper.  
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Background  
Digital transformation changes how systems are acquired and developed through 
the use of model-centric engineering practices and toolsets. While offering great 
benefit, new challenges arise from both technological and socio-cultural dimensions. 
This drives the need to examine and address vulnerabilities not only for products 
and systems, but also for the model-centric environments necessary for their 
acquisition and development. The research discussed in this report has investigated 
the use of cause-effect mapping as a mechanism for better enabling program 
managers and system engineers to anticipate and respond to programmatic 
vulnerabilities as related to model-centric environments.   
Prior research on cause-effect mapping for vulnerability analysis has included 
commercial and defense sectors. The research in the project is primarily focused on 
the defense sector.   The following terms are defined as used in this research 
project.  
acquisition The conceptualization, initiation, design, development, test, 
contracting, production, deployment, integrated product support 
(IPS), modification, and disposal of weapons and other systems, 
supplies, or services (including construction) to satisfy DoD needs, 
intended for use in, or in support of, military missions. 
analysis An evaluation, either quantitative or qualitative; synonymous with 
assessment. 
assessment Synonymous with analysis. 
causal chain A series of events, with each event causing or being an integral part 
of the cause, or the next “link” in the chain. 
causal factor Any aspect of the system which, when removed or changed, is 
likely to reduce the occurrence of emergent behavior, or, when 
induced, is likely to increase the occurrence of emergent behavior. 
classification A generic term for sorting a set by some defined metric, either 
quantitative or qualitative. Includes both taxonomies and typologies. 
Digital Systems 
Model 
A digital representation of a defense system, generated by all 
stakeholders that integrates the authoritative technical data and 
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associated artifacts which define all aspects of the system for the 
specific activities throughout the system lifecycle. 
external trigger A hazard external from the perspective of a defined user; 




A method of assessing and analyzing hazards, vulnerabilities, and 
risks in a comprehensive manner, as well as determining 
appropriate mitigations and countermeasures. 
hazard A system or environmental state that has the potential to disrupt the 
system. 
intermediary event Any unintended state change of a system’s form or operations 
which could jeopardize value delivery of the program and is situated 
along a causal chain connecting an external trigger to a terminal 
event. 
intervention point A means of disrupting or mitigating a vulnerability chain. 
model-centric 
engineering 
An overarching digital engineering approach that integrates different 
model types with simulations, surrogates, systems and components 
at different levels of abstraction and fidelity across disciplines 
throughout the lifecycle. 
program A directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, or 
continuing materiel, weapon or information system, or service 
capability in response to an approved need. 
risk A measure of the probability of a system disruption, the 
consequences of that disruption, and sometimes other factors such 




A method for analyzing a particular set of hazards, vulnerabilities, or 
risks. 
terminal event Any form of system degradation or failure, or of value loss. 
vulnerability The means by which the hazard might disrupt the system. 
vulnerability chain A conceptualization and representation of a vulnerability as a causal 
chain. 
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Literature Investigation 
Several areas of research were investigated during the project, model-centric 
engineering; vulnerability, hazard and risk analysis; and cause-effect mapping.  
Model-Centric Engineering 
Acquisition program management is grounded in management science and a 
sound set of practices that have evolved over decades. New challenges arise as 
acquisition becomes increasingly model-centric and traditional engineering 
transforms to digital model-based engineering. The systems engineering field is 
going through a period of significant transformation (Peterson, 2017). Advances in 
computing, digital workflows, and multi-domain-multi-scale models are leading to 
new concepts and approaches for model-centric engineering  (Piaszczyk, 2011; 
Reid & Rhodes, 2016; Glaessen & Sargel, 2015; Puckek et al., 2017; West & Pyster, 
2017).    
Model-Centric Engineering (MCE), has been defined as “An overarching 
digital engineering approach that integrates different model types with simulations, 
surrogates, systems and components at different levels of abstraction and fidelity 
across disciplines throughout the lifecycle” (Blackburn et al., 2017). MCE involves 
using integrated models across disciplines, subsystems, lifecycle stages, and 
analyst groups. It uses models as the “source of truth,” to reduce document handoff 
and allow for more continuous evaluation. This reduces communication time and 
rework in response to requirement changes. While many engineering organizations 
are applying various aspects of MCE (“Digital Tapestry,” 2015; Glaessgen & Stargel, 
2012; Kellner, 2015), implementation is not without its difficulties. Enhanced 
infrastructure and new leadership capabilities are needed. Increased connectivity 
means the danger of improper access is heightened. Even with sound MCE 
practices in use, there are still many challenges that remain. Efforts are also ongoing 
to identify inconsistent policies in an organization using model-based tools (e.g. 
Krishnan, Virani, & Gasoto, 2017; Virani & Rust, 2016). 
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Most discussions of MCE focus on engineering practices and methods to 
overcome implementation difficulties. In any system, however, engineering is only a 
piece of the problem; numerous human factors, business, and organizational issues 
exist. Program managers and system engineers must learn how to identify and 
address programmatic vulnerabilities that are associated with model-centric 
transformation, as these may pose threats to programmatic schedule, budget and 
performance outcomes.  
Current program managers and engineering leaders have significant 
experience with modern engineering processes, which they use to identify and 
mitigate such vulnerabilities. Minimal experience exists specific to MCE and model-
centric environments, however. This fact, coupled with the increased integration of 
models, means that emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive 
technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic 
decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to cascading 
vulnerabilities within MCE programs, potentially jeopardizing program success. New 
tools are needed to enable program managers to readily identify model-centric 
program vulnerabilities and determine where interventions can most effectively be 
taken. 
Vulnerability, Risk, and Hazard Analysis 
Numerous methods for analyzing vulnerabilities, risks, and hazards exist. 
These three interrelated terms have different definitions depending on the field and 
on the method of analysis. In this research, a hazard refers to a system or 
environmental state that has the potential to disrupt the system. Examples include 
the existence of an iceberg at sea and tired operators. Hazards may not result in 
system failure, partly depending on the design of the system.  
A vulnerability is the means by which the hazard might disrupt the system, 
thus it is through the vulnerability that the system is susceptible to the hazard. 
Vulnerabilities are best expressed as the causal series of events connecting a 
hazard to system failure. This is a generalization of common, field-specific usage of 
the term. MITRE’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database defines 
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a vulnerability as “a weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in 
software and some hardware components (e.g., firmware) that, when exploited, 
results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, OR availability” (The MITRE 
Corporation, 2015). In this definition, the same components can be seen: some 
structural means or “weakness,” that can result in system disruption or “negative 
impact” if a hazard is present or the vulnerability is “exploited.” For example, the 
infamous Spectre security vulnerability is described by CVE as “Systems with 
microprocessors utilizing speculative execution and branch prediction may allow 
unauthorized disclosure of information to an attacker with local user access via a 
side-channel analysis” (The MITRE Corporation, 2017). This is a neat summary of 
the hazard (an attacker), the means (side-channel analysis using speculative 
execution and branch prediction), and the disruption (unauthorized disclosure of 
information). 
Risk is a measure of the probability of a system disruption and the 
consequences of that disruption. It is commonly expressed with just a statement of 
those two components: 1.25 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles. Sometimes risk is 
instead expressed as a multiplication of likelihood and consequence or includes 
other components such as detectability. 
Common means of analysis include Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure 
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA, though sometimes reduced to 
FMEA), Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), and Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA). 
FTA is a deductive, top-down analysis method where a failure mode is 
identified and all the possible causes of that event are laid out in sequences until the 
exogenous hazards are reached. Logic gates are used to connect the various 
hazards and intermediary events. An example FTA may be seen in Figure 1. 
Probabilities may be assigned to each hazard and thus a cumulative probability of 
the failure calculated. FTA is thus quite proficient in investigating the cause of 
failures afterwards, but is limited in its ability to identify all possible hazards. 
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Additionally, it is somewhat limited by its arbitrary stopping point (i.e. where one 
chooses to define an event as an exogenous hazard).  
 
Figure 1. Simplified Fault-Tree Analysis of the sinking of the Titanic 
ETA is essentially an inverted FTA. Instead of starting from a failure and 
working backwards to a hazard, a hazard is selected and logic gates are used to 
assess potential consequences. This method is useful for predicting potential 
failures rather than determining the cause of a previous one. It suffers from some of 
the same limitation as FTA. Additionally, it fails to examine the consequences of 
multiple concurrent hazards. 
FMECA is an inductive method, similar to ETA, which seeks to tabulate all 
possible failures and then assess their severity, probability, detectability, and 
criticality. It excels at thoroughness but suffers from an inability to easily access 
multiple failures simultaneously. Additionally, its tabular format can be difficult to 
read. An example FMECA is in Figure 2. 
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Function Dispense amount of cash requested by customer 
Potential Failure Mode Does not dispense cash Dispenses too much cash 
















Severity Rating 8 6 
Potential Cause(s) of Failure 










in wrong trays 
Occurrence Rating 5 3 2 2 3 















Detectability Rating 5 10 10 7 4 
Risk Priority Number  200 240 160 84 72 
Criticality 40 24 16 12 18 
 
Figure 2. Portion of an FMECA. Adapted from (Tague, 2004) 
 
STPA takes a rather different approach and conceptualizes systems as 
control loops, as can be seen in Figure 3. The goal of STPA is to avoid focusing on 
exhaustively tabulating all vulnerabilities and attempting to quantitatively calculate 
probabilities. These can be difficult to do accurately for a system of any significant 
size. Instead, STPA attempts to ensure that appropriate monitors and controls are in 
place for each component of the system (including its operators) so that any hazard 
is detected and addressed before it can cause a failure. In this way, it seeks to 
eliminate vulnerabilities while relying primarily on a qualitative, rather than a 
quantitative, assessment. 
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Figure 3. Example STPA Diagram. Image from (Leveson, 2013) 
Most of vulnerability analysis methods fail to directly grapple with the problem 
of blame (though STPA does). Humans have a tendency to assign blame for a 
failure to someone or something other than themselves. FTA, ETA, and FMECA can 
enable this by allowing for an arbitrary “stopping point” (i.e., where the previous step 
in the causal chain is deemed the initiating hazard). In the Titanic FTA presented in 
Figure 1, for instance, why did we stop deconstructing the causes there? Were the 
designers of the rudder actually at fault? Or were the engineering standards poorly 
written? Were the owners of the boat at fault for putting too few lifeboats or should 
the government or industrial organizations set a minimum required number of 
lifeboats? By adjusting bounds of the analysis, it is easy to place blame on 
whomever the analyst desires. STPA avoids this by (a) not assigning a specific 
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“cause” of a failure and (b) by having every part of the system responsible for 
monitoring the other parts.  Despite this, as the originators of STPA themselves 
acknowledge, the method has been criticized for its lack of a neat, one-page 
explanation of causes of an accident (Leveson, 2013). 
Cause-Effect Mapping 
Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) captures some of the benefits of STPA while 
still presenting distinct cause-effect paths. CEM has previously been applied to a 
case study of a Maritime Security System of Systems (Mekdeci, Ross, Rhodes, & 
Hastings, 2012) and to a supply chain case (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016). It consists of a 
mapping of causal chains that connect an exogenous hazard to a system 
degradation or failure, termed a terminal event. Each chain represents a 
vulnerability, sometimes called a vulnerability chain in order to emphasize that 
vulnerabilities are not discrete events. Terminal events are broadly defined and 
include any form of value loss. An example CEM can be seen in Figure 4. Similar to 
FTA, CEM is easily read in either direction, but it also allows for the simultaneous 
consideration of multiple failures and multiple hazards.  The hazards are external to 
the perspective of the defined user, and are thus sometimes called external triggers. 
An intermediary event is any unintended state change of a system’s form or 
operations which could jeopardize value delivery of the program.  
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Figure 4. Example CEM of a supply chain. Image from (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) 
A CEM is not created for a system, but for a specific class of decision-maker. 
The hazards (referred to as “spontaneous events” are exogenous from the point of 
view of the decision-maker that the CEM was made for. In this way, CEM avoids the 
aforementioned “blaming someone else” problem by making all hazards exogenous. 
The decision-maker only has control over the intermediary events. While program 
managers may not be at fault for any of the vulnerabilities, it is still their responsibility 
to address them. 
CEM is fundamentally a qualitative analysis method, though it can be readily 
adapted into a quantitative form, by adding probabilities of transition to each 
intermediary. CEM provides immediate insight into which parts of the system warrant 
more detailed modeling. For instance, it may be useful to determine the likely time 
required for a specific vulnerability to complete. CEM enables classification of 
different vulnerability chains (by terminal event, by triggering event or type of 
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triggering event, or by intermediary event). Additionally, it allows immediate 
identification of potential intervention points at intermediary events where multiple 
vulnerability chains intersect.  
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Vulnerabilities within Model-Centric Programs 
Vulnerabilities within programs and program environments were investigated 
through literature and expert interviews.  
Programmatic Vulnerabilities 
Programmatic vulnerabilities differ from technological system vulnerabilities in 
a number of ways. Programmatic vulnerabilities tend to be more people-oriented, 
involving politics, economics, incentives, social interactions, and the like. They tend 
to be much less studied, assessed, and understood, both in academia and in 
practice. Over the course of this study, a series of interviews was conducted with 
system engineers and program managers from a variety of fields, including defense, 
aerospace, manufacturing, and semiconductors. These interviews sought to provide 
insight into the following questions, in context of a model-centric enterprise: 
1. To what extent are program managers aware of programmatic vulnerabilities? 
2. How do program managers conceptualize these vulnerabilities?  
3. How to program managers respond to these vulnerabilities? 
4. What vulnerabilities are present in MCE programs? 
 
The first three questions provided some useful information regarding the 
status quo. Across all these industries, several facts were clear. First, many, if not 
most, programmatic vulnerabilities appear to be triggered by exogenous hazards 
beyond the control of the program manager. Some, such as poor scope or 
inadequate budget, were present before the first program manager joined a 
program. In general, program managers are at least aware of the potential for these 
hazards and in some cases can even see them coming. There was some variance in 
responses, however. Some attempt to do things like preemptive padding of a 
schedule using a multiplicative factor based on experience. Others used their own 
spreadsheets and tools for estimating the “real” schedule or cost (that is, the 
schedule or cost that would result from a potential hazard becoming real). Little to no 
formal risk or vulnerability assessment would take place however and responses 
tended to be reactive rather than proactive, contributing to the “program 
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management via crisis management” paradigm. In general, the perception by 
interviewees was that program managers rely heavily on expertise, rather than on 
formal education. While some, such as the INCOSE PM-SE Integration Working 
Group’s Strategic Initiative seek to directly address the exogenous hazards and 
others seek to provide risk registries that contain programmatic risks (Hall, 2018), 
there is a real need for easy to use tools for program managers to improve their 
ability to assess programmatic vulnerabilities and respond to them. The fourth 
question was intended to supplement and corroborate a Reference CEM. 
Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment 
Risk and vulnerability assessment methods have not failed to adapt to novel 
cybersecurity concerns. The aforementioned CVE database has been public since 
1999. Quality Assurance testing (essentially the verification and validation of 
software) has been around since the beginning of commercial software. Software 
penetration testing (where security experts intentionally seek to break a software 
product) has been the industry norm for more than a decade (Arkin, Stender, & 
McGraw, 2005). Black-box mutational fuzzing and concolic execution are being used 
to automatically test for certain types of software vulnerabilities (Schwarz, 2018). 
Formal verification tools, initially limited to pure software domains such as 
cryptography (Meadows, 1994), has been rapidly advancing and finding applications 
in hardware (Kern & Greenstreet, 1999) and business processes (Morimoto, 2008), 
as well as fields that straddle the software-hardware-environment boundaries 
(Kamali, Dennis, McAree, Fisher, & Veres, 2016). The methods listed here just 
scratch the surface of approaches security researchers and engineers are taking to 
identify and resolve such technical cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 
Beyond these specific testing methods, assessment frameworks have 
progressed as well. System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) has adjusted, 
adapted, and been applied to handle cybersecurity vulnerabilities associated with 
additive manufacturing (Pope & Yampolskiy, 2016), Internet of Things (Pope, 2017), 
Air Operations (Young, 2013), and Mission Operations (Young & Porada, 2017). 
More recently, there have also been efforts to combine compiler technology with 
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STPA to automatically detect vulnerabilities in software-controlled systems (Pope, 
2018).  
While cybersecurity vulnerabilities in operational systems remain alarming 
common, from the trivial (Hanselman, 2012) to the critical (Gressin, 2017), there is 
some evidence that software is becoming more secure, at least in terms of defects 
per line of equivalent source code (Pope, 2017). In many cases, however, the 
acquisition or development process itself needs to be protected from outside threats 
and endogenous failures. Be it military information or technology-related trade 
secrets, there is real value in attempting to penetrate much earlier in the life cycle in 
order to either steal secrets (Hanna, Smythe, & Martin, 2018; Raymond, 2017) or to 
disrupt production (Statt, 2018) . 
Defense acquisition programs have already instituted a variety of means of 
ensuring the security of their work. Some of these means were originally instituted to 
address other forms of threats but have turned out to be effective in addressing 
cybersecurity as well. These methods include relying on the security clearance 
process, the use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), 
restrictions on the use of media storage devices, separate networks such as 
SIPRNet and NIPRNet that are isolated or semi-isolated from the internet, and 
general compartmentalization of critical information. Some (non-US) defense 
agencies have gone so far as to revert to using typewriters where able in order to 
avoid security breaches and leaks (Irvine & Parfitt, 2013). 
Unfortunately, many of these historically successful methods are in conflict 
with the more straightforward implementations of many components of an MCE 
environment. For example, the use of SCIFs has been quite successful in preventing 
unauthorized access to data. The typical use of a SCIF in design, where a small 
number of engineers work on a task isolated from the outside world, is not directly 
compatible with an MCE environment structured around model integration and 
collaboration across teams and locations. While this problem has been previously 
considered and ways to mitigate this conflict have been proposed (e.g., Reid & 
Rhodes, 2016), no silver bullet to resolving these tensions exists and it is likely that 
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the increased use of MCE will result in both the exacerbation of current 
vulnerabilities and the creation of new ones. Furthermore, most means of assessing 
such vulnerabilities are aimed at assisting software and systems engineers to 
identify and remove cybersecurity vulnerabilities from the end system. New methods 
for enabling project and program managers to perform cybersecurity assessments of 
their enterprise and engineering environment are needed. 
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Methodology 
A primary objective of this research was to develop a high-level cause-effect 
map for model-centric programs to serve as a reference for use by program 
managers. The intent is for this CEM to serve both as a standalone resource for 
such program managers, as well as a basis for organizations to construct their own, 
program-specific CEM with added detail. Additionally, this research sought to 
document the general steps to creating and using CEM in general, as well as 
conduct some initial usability testing of the usefulness of the Reference CEM. 
The arrangement of the vulnerability chains is not random. External triggers 
that result in similar vulnerability chains are grouped together. By “similar,” we mean 
that these vulnerability chains either involve many of the same intermediary events 
or that they involve the same part of the program. For instance, most of the 
intermediary events involving model curation and trust are located close to one 
another in the center-top of Figure 5 below.  The external triggers were classified 
into three different domains.   
 Force Majeure: This is a general term for an event that is the result of actions 
beyond the possibility of the program enterprise (not just the program 
manager) to influence. Thus it includes both malicious action and general, 
unforeseeable events such as Technological Change. 
 Policy: An event that is the result of intentional decisions made at the 
organizational or enterprise level. In the case of a government-run program, 
this includes oversight from Congress and the general public. Non-
government organizations may still be impacted indirectly by such oversight, 
but their proximal triggering event would be different. 
 Private Sector: Any event that is the result of the actions of one or more 
private-sector firms outside the program enterprise.  
Once the Reference CEM was created, intervention points were identified. These 
are indicated as the small blue circle in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Reference CEM for Model-Centric Vulnerabilities (Preliminary)
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Generating the CEM 
Generating a CEM can be done in different ways and to different levels of 
granularity, depending on the needs of the stakeholder (program manager, 
engineering leader, etc.). This process can be done with groups, such as project 
teams, as well as individually. The general process is: 
1. The stakeholder lists potential hazards posed to the program. 
2. The consequences of each of these hazards are traced through the 
intermediary events to the final terminal events. 
3. The process is then done in reverse: the stakeholder looks at the terminal 
events, adds in any that are still missing, and works backwards on how they 
might come about. 
4. The causal connections between each intermediary event are examined to 
see if there are any additional connections not previously noticed. 
5. Finally, the stakeholder consults lessons learned databases, case studies, 
and other experts to generate additional hazards, intermediary events, causal 
connections, and interventions, as well as to verify existing ones. 
The Reference CEM, shown in Figure 5 was generated through a 
combination of methods. At this time, there is little literature on programmatic 
vulnerabilities posed by MCE. Most negative case studies, that is those that depict 
failures (Software Engineering Institute, 2007), and lessons learned databases 
(NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, 1994) are from prior to the rise of MCE and thus 
deal with general vulnerabilities. Existing case studies that directly deal with MCE 
tend to me more positive, likely due to the rising popularity of the paradigm 
(Conigliaro, Kerzhner, & Paredis, 2009; Maley & Long, 2005; Martz & Neu, 2008). 
As a result of these, extrapolations from extant vulnerabilities had to be made, along 
with hypothetical inversions of the positive instances of MCE. Additional 
vulnerabilities were contributed by group brainstorming. All of these were 
supplemented and confirmed by the expert interviews. 
The higher level of detail in the upper portion of the CEM, which includes 
issues such as training, misunderstood model assumptions, and level of trust in the 
models, represents the increased degree of concern that interviewees had about 
these issues. In general, the domain of aligning culture and expertise with well-
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designed and well-documented toolsets was of high priority. Failure to accomplish 
this had led to significant problems in past projects, but was viewed as a 
surmountable difficulty moving forward. 
Using the CEM 
Vulnerability analysis methods are most commonly applied either to the 
design or the operation of an engineered system. This is usually done to improve its 
design or investigate a failure. However, these methods can also be applied to the 
program itself. Instead of hazards such as “relief valve failure” and “solar flare” 
instead we have “hiring freeze” and “unexpected technological hurtle.” It can be 
difficult to assess likelihoods for such hazards, but even qualitative analysis can be 
useful. Similarly, terminal events are not “nuclear meltdown” or “loss of 
communications” but instead “schedule delay” or “failure during 
verification/validation.”   
CEM in particular can be used to assess vulnerabilities in multiple ways and 
by different individuals. Four uses are described below: 
1. By a Program Manager: Assessing potential future vulnerabilities and plan 
possible interventions. 
2. By a Program Manager: Determining specific vulnerabilities to address in 
response to the presence of a specific hazard. 
3. By the Program Organization: Change program processes to mitigate or 
eliminate vulnerabilities. 
4. By MCE Researchers: Organize and classify vulnerabilities into various 
categories or types 
All of these start with the creation of a CEM for the organization’s standard 
program process or a particular program. Once this is completed additional steps 
can be taken including: 
 Identifying notable intermediary events and potential intervention points 
 Conducting more detailed modeling of specific vulnerability chains 
 Classifying vulnerability chains to enable future study and potential mitigation. 
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While a program manager would be well served by the creation of a CEM 
specific to their own program, there is general benefit in using the Reference CEM 
for a model-centric program.  Use (A) is most relevant for novice program managers 
or program managers using MCE for the first time. A senior program manager or 
team of program managers creates a CEM for their organization’s program process. 
This CEM can then be provided to the novice for study and reference. The program 
manager can then learn what can go wrong and how to intervene. In this case, the 
CEM could be tied to a Lesson’s Learned database, such as NASA’s Lessons 
Learned Information System (NASA Office of the Chief Engineer, 1994). This 
enables concrete examples and consequences to be linked to each vulnerability. 
One of the important factors here is that the CEM does not just present potential 
interventions, but it also places them in the appropriate part of the causal sequence. 
This enables the program manager to not only know how to intervene, but at what 
point. 
Use (B) is relevant to all program managers, regardless of level of 
experience. Once a hazard manifests, the program manager examines the CEM to 
assess potential consequences and options. He can then respond quickly to head 
off any cascading effects. This may require additional analysis of a specific 
vulnerability chain or an individual intermediary event. System Dynamics is a method 
particularly useful for this due to the preexisting models of many organizational 
phenomena (Rouwette & Ghaffarzadegan, 2013). For instance, the Attrition, 
Reduced Model Training, and Less Model Expertise can be modeled by adapting the 
rookie fraction model shown in Figure 6 into the more MCE-relevant model shown in 
Figure 7. In this model, it is apparent that a hiring freeze (which would set the 
“Growth Rate” variable to zero) has no immediate impact, as rookies will continue to 
develop into experienced employees and model expertise will continue to 
accumulate. Overtime, however, the dearth of new rookies will result in fewer 
experienced employees, increasing the error rate. These kinds of long-term, indirect 
impacts are likely to become more common with increased use of MCE.  
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Figure 6. System Dynamics Model of Employee Training Rate. Adapted from (Sterman, 2000) 
 
Figure 7. System Dynamics Model of Accumulated Modeling Errors 
Use (C) is the traditional use of vulnerability assessment methods: to improve 
a design or investigate a failure. The program organization can change policies or 
create infrastructure to either mitigate or wholly eliminate certain vulnerability chains. 
For example, if the organization elects to only use modeling software produced in-
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house, the three hazards in the “Software Changes” grouping of Figure 5 are no 
longer relevant. Such a change could be costly though or even introduce new 
vulnerabilities, so careful analysis is necessary. In this use, the CEM is a visual 
representation of a risk registry, tabulated all possible hazards to the program and 
mitigation choices made (Hall, 2018).  
In Use (D), CEM is used to organize and classify vulnerability chains. Two 
obvious classifiers are terminal events and hazards. Which is used to organize a 
CEM depends on whether the user wants to examine the causal chains forward or 
backwards. Beyond this, however, more complicated classifiers are possible. As can 
be seen in Figure 5, external triggers that result in similar vulnerability chains are 
grouped together. By “similar,” we mean that these vulnerability chains either involve 
many of the same intermediary events or that they involve the same part of the 
program. For instance, most of the intermediary events involving model curation and 
trust are located close to one another in the center-top of the figure. Once these 
groupings have been identified, they can be considered together, such as the “Belt-
tightening” grouping, and common means of intervention considered. 
Usability Testing 
While several potential use cases were proposed in the previous section, due 
to the scale, duration, cost, and uniqueness of major MCE programs, it is difficult to 
systematically test the utility of either the Reference CEM or of using CEM in 
general. Some simple usability testing was explored in the interviews with experts. 
Usability was also considered through analyzing results of a scenario-based 
exercise on vulnerability analysis using a data set that was previously generated in a 
graduate class activity involving techniques for investigating enterprises. 
The class activity involved approximately 40 students from various 
backgrounds, most having prior experience in either industry or the military as 
systems engineers and/or program managers. The students were randomly divided 
into six groups of 5-7 students each, and each group was provided with the same 
“context” for the activity, as follows. 
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You are a project manager for a vehicle manufacturer. Your current 
project is designing a lightweight troop transport vehicle for the US 
military. It has a variety of high-tech components, including 
encrypted radio and satellite communication systems, an explosives 
detector, and night vision cameras. The design and testing process 
will take multiple years. Your company considers this a major project 
in terms of the resources put into it, the revenue received for it, and 
the potential for future military contracts. The military, as part of the 
contract, specified that the design and production process should 
predominately rely on models (sometimes called model-centric 
engineering) rather than written specifications. 
Each group was provided with 1 or 2 selected external triggers or hazards to 
respond to. They were asked to discuss and record the potential negative impacts 
these hazards may have on the engineering environment and how they might act to 
mitigate these consequences. The hazards provided are as follows: 
1. An unrelated military project (at another company) to design a next-generation 
missile defense system has ended up in the national news. That system has 
gone significantly over budget, has been repeatedly delayed, and still looks 
like it is a long way off from being completed. Public accusations of 
mismanagement and waste are being made, including of frivolous travel and 
lavish company events. Congress and the Department of Defense are now 
carefully scrutinizing all other major projects for potential mismanagement or 
waste, including your project. 
2. After recent elections, there is significant political pressure on Congress to 
reduce federal spending. As a result of this, they are making significant cuts to 
many agencies and programs, including the military. The decrease in 
government spending is likely to impact your company’s other projects and 
may impact yours as well. 
3. Government intelligence officials inform your company that your company, and 
perhaps even your project, is likely to be the target of cybersecurity attacks 
based out of another nation. 
4. This is your first project of this type (your prior experience was in designing 
civilian vehicles). You now have to choose whether your project will use the 
set of modeling software that you are accustomed to from the civilian projects 
or to use another set, more commonly used on military projects, but that you 
are unfamiliar with. 
5. A recent economic downturn, coupled with a government that is cutting back 
on its military spending, has resulted in your company declaring a hiring freeze 
for an indeterminate amount of time. 
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6. Another project at your company is threatening to miss its deadlines. In order 
to get it back in line, its project manager is requesting that personnel from 
other projects, such as yours, be reallocated to hers. 
7. The design requirements from the military that you are currently working with 
were put together with the idea of using this vehicle in a currently ongoing 
conflict. However, US involvement in this conflict is winding down and the 
military is currently unsure where this vehicle will be used in the future. The 
context (and requirements) may change during the design process. 
Furthermore, your models were created with current context in mind. 
8. A recent economic downturn, coupled with a government that is cutting back 
on its military spending, has resulted in your company providing incentives for 
early retirement to the more experienced, higher paid employees. You have no 
intention of retiring early yourself, but some of those working on your project 
might accept the offer. 
9. In order to minimize rework and redundancy, your company has recently 
started an initiative pushing for increased reuse of components, designs, and 
models from one project to another. Your previous project also involved a night 
vision camera, but in a very different application context. 
10. A particular piece of simulation software that your company has used on 
similar projects in the past is licensed from another company. The license 
contract is up for renewal soon and the price might go up significantly. You are 
uncertain if your company’s executives will approve the license renewal. 
After a period of 20 minutes, the students were taught about causal chains 
and use of the CEM reference model as a technique for investigating enterprise 
vulnerabilities. Each group was instructed to re-write the previously identified 
vulnerabilities and interventions as causal chains, and map them on the provided 
CEM (Figure 8), as well as coming up with new ones. After another period of 20 
minutes, their results were collected, a group debrief was given, and students 
shared general feedback on the class activity. [Note: The CEM presented in Figure 8 
is similar to that in Figure 5 but not identical, as knowledge gained in interviews and 
usability testing has since been used to further develop the CEM.]  
Several useful pieces of information could be garnered through analyzing the 
documented results of the class activity that had been conducted. In the out-briefing 
material, the participants expressed unanimous agreement that using CEM and 
conceptualizing programmatic vulnerabilities as causal chains was helpful, though 
the perceived degree of usefulness varied from “slightly” to “extremely”. Additionally, 
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team out-briefs reported on four primary forms of how the CEM helped in their 
assigned scenario in the class exercise.  
1. Identifying high priority intervention points: (70%) 
2. Identifying new vulnerabilities: (55%) 
3. Understanding the causal path / Reframing the concept of vulnerabilities: 
(45%) 
4. Understanding interrelationships between vulnerabilities: (40%) 
The relative importance of this first point was corroborated by the group 
outputs that were generated. It was clear that in this instance, when provided with a 
Reference CEM, the groups tended to focus on identifying where and how to 
intervene in the vulnerability chains. During the first round (without the CEM), most 
of the groups had presented their vulnerabilities and interventions as unordered lists 
of short phrases, typically unpaired (i.e. vulnerabilities were not matched with 
interventions). These short phrases were typically isolated events such as “team 
feeling more cautious” and “reputation damages.” The ultimate outcomes of these 
were assumed rather than explicitly stated. Once the CEM was introduced in the 
second round, the matching of interventions to vulnerabilities appeared to become 
much clearer, and most groups also identified additional interventions. 
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Figure 8. Reference CEM used as a basis for usability testing   
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Findings  
The transformation of acquisition programs to model-centric acquisition 
introduces vulnerabilities that either do not exist, or are less severe than those in 
past. While these vulnerabilities pose a challenge, they have thus far been 
overshadowed by addressing the difficulties of implementing MCE practices. This 
research has provided additional insight into what vulnerabilities may exist and how 
they may be identified.  
In particular, viewing vulnerabilities as causal chains enables an enriched 
description and means to understand the complexities that are faced. Investigation 
suggests that program managers currently do not formally grapple with 
programmatic vulnerabilities as they do with vulnerabilities in the end-system. Many 
program managers mentally conceptualize vulnerabilities as discrete events with 
vague likelihoods. Conceptualizing vulnerabilities as causal chains instead 
encourages a more structured and detailed consideration of programmatic 
vulnerabilities. This work made it clear that conceptualizing vulnerabilities as causal 
chains is not only viable, but quite useful for improving the ability to recognize the 
similarities and connections between vulnerabilities as well as to identify potential 
means of intervention.  
One of the objectives of this research was to develop Reference CEM for 
model-centric programs. The intent is for this CEM to serve as a both a collection of 
research findings and a reference for validation and further analysis. Additionally, it 
has the benefit of potentially serving as a standalone resource for such program 
managers, as well as a basis for organizations to construct their own, program-
specific CEM with added detail. The Reference CEM was generated through a 
combination of methods. At this time, there is little literature on programmatic 
vulnerabilities posed by MCE. Most negative case studies, that is those that depict 
failures, and lessons learned databases are from prior to the rise of MCE and thus 
deal with general vulnerabilities. Existing case studies that directly deal with MCE 
tend to be more positive, likely due to the rising popularity of the paradigm. As a 
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result of these, extrapolations from extant vulnerabilities had to be made, along with 
hypothetical inversions of the positive instances of MCE. Additional vulnerabilities 
were contributed by group brainstorming and expert interviews.   In practical use of 
the CEM process, program managers would create a more detailed CEM of their 
own MCE environment or use the Reference CEM as a general reference to better 
understand MCE-related vulnerabilities. 
The Reference CEM provides an additional tool to program managers and 
researchers as an entry point to analyze MCE-related programmatic vulnerabilities in 
various contexts. Via the usability testing, the Reference CEM has been 
demonstrated to be useful for identifying and prioritizing interventions in MCE-related 
vulnerabilities. It can also be used to categorize vulnerabilities and promote 
understanding of the underlying connections between them.  
Expert interviews and usability testing were performed with program 
managers and systems engineers (the people who “live in” in the MCE 
environment).  These led to various insights and confirmed the need for considering 
additional viewpoints from MBSE and MCE tool developers, as well as from the 
leaders of enterprise MCE environments. The former may yield additional potential 
MCE-related vulnerabilities that are ‘invisible’ to the users of the MCE tools, 
particularly on the cybersecurity front, and possibility identify ways to intervene in or 
preemptively eliminate some of the vulnerabilities identified in the Reference CEM. 
This would be particularly useful in filling in the “gap” of interventions and potentially 
enable the creation of new CEMs, aimed at enterprise leaders rather than program 
managers, as there are doubtlessly organizational vulnerabilities that threaten the 
success of acquisition programs just as there are programmatic vulnerabilities. 
Various analytic approaches were considered during the research. These 
included network analysis, graph theory techniques, and use of system dynamics.  
This exploration reinforced the potential benefit of augmenting the use of cause-
effect mapping with other analytic techniques to enrich the analysis. In particular, 
there is a need to better determine where to place intervention points in intertwined 
vulnerability chains.  Simple in-degree/out-degree analysis is helpful, but more 
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sophisticated applications of graph theory and probabilistic modeling offer greater 
potential benefit. These can be conducted using the Reference CEM if more 
information about a specific system is known. For instance, if probabilities, 
likelihoods, or time scales of each event transition are known, techniques such as 
Markov Chain Modeling, Monte Carlo Analysis, and Bayesian Networks can be 
brought to bear, weighting each arc of the graph instead of treating them equally. 
Cybersecurity was selected as an area for additional consideration. The MCE 
Reference CEM shown in Figure 5 was generated using literature reviews and 
interviews with experts, among other sources. The cybersecurity portion of it was 
adapted, mostly unchanged, from previous work on supply chains (Rovito & Rhodes, 
2016).  As cybersecurity is a rising international concern and is particular relevant 
with the increasing digitization associated with MCE environments, the research 
team did some preliminary exploration of these aspects through interviews.   When it 
came to the topic of cybersecurity vulnerabilities in general, the interviewees 
commonly raised the following issues: 
 Cybersecurity needs to be thoroughly considered much earlier than it 
commonly is, preferably in the proposal generation stage. 
 Program managers and systems engineers are sometimes intimidated by 
cybersecurity issues and thus seek to pass them onto specialists later in the 
acquisition process. 
 MBSE and MCE toolset developers and proponents have not done a 
thorough enough job of considering programmatic cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, though the tools are typically quite effective at designing for 
cybersecurity in end systems. 
 Despite all of the above, according to the interviewees, traditional 
programmatic cybersecurity defensive practices tend to quite effective. This is 
due primarily to the conservative approaches most defense-related 
engineering groups use. The increased use of MCE, particularly for multi-site 
collaboration could change this. 
The above points, many of which were commonly stated by the same expert, 
are clearly nuanced and complicated, with both points of success and failure. These 
points, along with more specific comments from the interviewees, resulted in an 
initial version of an expanded cybersecurity CEM that can be seen in Figure 9. Note 
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that in its full form, this would still be a part of the general Reference CEM shown in 
Figure 5. Here it is shown isolated for clarity.  
 
Figure 9. Reference Cybersecurity CEM (Preliminary)
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Some of the vulnerabilities and interventions shown in Figure 9 are not unique 
to MCE environments. Some of the vulnerabilities will simply be exacerbated by 
increased use of MCE environments and processes. Some of the interventions will 
require new, creative means of implementing. For instance, Intervention Point #1 in 
Figure 9 is “Compartmentalize sensitive information.” Clearly this is already done 
with the use of SCIFs and the Need-To-Know (NTK) information framework. 
However, such methods may not be feasible if the benefits of model integration and 
collaboration offered by MCE are desired. Instead new methods must be developed. 
An example of one such possibility is the Federal Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
Sentinel Initiative, which involves querying a distributed system and receiving 
anonymized, aggregate data back (Office of Surveillane and Epidemiology, 2010). 
Such a system may allow modeling software to communicate across domains and 
locations, while still ensuring that even if one location is breached, only some 
information is exposed. 
This Reference CEM does omit vulnerabilities and interventions that are 
entirely unchanged, however. For example, practices like the security clearance 
system and restricting the usual of digital storage media will remain effective 
interventions that are not significantly impacted by MCE environments.  
One set of vulnerabilities that came up repeatedly in both the interviews and 
was observed in the class activity data set were those that passed through the 
reputation harm intermediate event (Figure 10). Despite the frequency that the 
potential for this vulnerability was raised, few interventions were proposed for post-
breach. This suggests that program managers and systems engineers could use 
more training in how to respond to breaches, particularly prominent ones, instead of 
just how to prevent them. While in the private sector there is evidence suggesting 
that the reputation harm incurred by a prominent breach does not significantly 
impact the firm, contractors to the government are known to suffer significant 
financial penalties due to breaches, even when such a breach is unrelated to their 
government duties (Braun, 2014; Overly, 2017). In a defense acquisition 
environment, there is thus significant incentive to having program managers (and the 
enterprise as a whole) well prepared to respond to major breaches. 
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Figure 10. Reputation Harm Vulnerabilities 
CEM is intended to supplement, rather than replace, existing vulnerability 
assessment methods, particularly when it comes to cybersecurity. In this way, it can 
help fulfill the requirements set by NIST’s Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
(Ross, et al., 2016) and the DoD’s Defense Federal Acquisition Rules Supplement 
(DFARS) (Manufacturing Extension Partnership, 2017b). These regulations have 
shifted how government contractors handle cybersecurity. Previously, one-time 
assessments were completed and defensive practices instituted, now the process is 
more dynamic. Contractors have to continuously assess threats and develop 
countermeasures as they arise, both with regards to the end-system and to the 
enterprise. CEM can potentially assist in this, by serving as a reference that can be 
revisited as new threats arise.  
Based on the exploratory work on cybersecurity vulnerabilities, a proposed 
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Recommendations & Future Directions 
Digital engineering is transforming the systems acquisition process 
(Zimmerman, Gilbert, & Salvatore, 2017), including the model-centric techniques 
and toolsets. Enterprises face new challenges in this transformation, including 
potential for new vulnerabilities within model-centric enterprises.  While vulnerability 
analysis of products and systems is performed, examining vulnerabilities within an 
enterprise is less common. Vulnerability analysis of the enterprise becomes 
increasingly urgent given increasing complexity and interconnectivity in model-
centric environments used to make system decisions. The interim outcomes of this 
research, including expert interview results, show the potential benefit of cause-
effect mapping techniques and availability of a reference map for model-centric 
program vulnerability analysis. Additional expert interviews are planned with an 
expanded set of stakeholders. 
Insights into usability were also gained through analyzing a data set that had 
been generated in a classroom setting. Accordingly, the results should be viewed as 
purely exploratory, but there appears to be justification for future research to include 
conducting a controlled human-subjects research experiment (similar to the 
scenario-based exercise used in a classroom setting). Additionally, an important 
future research activity is to evaluate the Reference CEM on a pilot project in a real 
world model-centric engineering program. Further development of the Reference 
CEM is planned for next phase research, including more extensive investigation of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities resulting from model-centric practices and infrastructure.  
As the research progress, three directions of future research are being 
pursued (Reid, 2018). The first is to conduct a second round of interviews with other 
stakeholders in the acquisition process.  The second is to evolve an interactive 
version of the Reference CEM.  The third is to compare vulnerabilities present in 
MCE environments with those present in other, comparable fields. 
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Future Interviews 
The interviews thus far have been with program managers and system 
engineers (the people who “live in” in the MCE environment). As this research 
progresses, a future round of interviews with MBSE and MCE toolmakers and 
leaders of enterprise model-centric environments is desired. Several of the 
interviewees expressed an interest in increased enterprise-level ownership of MCE 
environments. Additionally, a few expressed concern about the degree of security in 
MCE toolsets. Additional work is needed to understand the varying perspectives on 
vulnerabilities in MCE environments. One of the benefits of future interviews with 
MCE tool makers would be the identification of additional cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities and interventions.  
Interactive Tool 
An interactive version of the CEM, which enables easy sorting and adding 
vulnerabilities, is desired. This would make the method more accessible, similar to 
how NIST’s  Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (Manufacturing Extension Partnership, 
2017a) makes the RMF (Ross et al., 2016) more approachable to small 
manufacturers. Additionally, it could serve as a platform for future usability testing of 
CEM in MCE programs.  A desired future research task is to develop an interactive 
demonstration prototype that synthesizes the research outcomes to show how these 
can be used in practice. 
Healthcare Industry Comparison 
There is some indication that program managers may be well served by 
observing fields that are somewhat analogous to defense acquisition, in order to 
derive helpful metaphors (Karas, Moore, & Parrott, 2008) or lessons learned 
(German & Rhodes, 2016).  The healthcare industry shows promise for such an 
analogy for cybersecurity in MCE environments. The healthcare industry deals with 
sensitive information, computer equipment, and high pressure environments. All of 
these are present at numerous stages of operation. Patient records have to be able 
to be transferred from one system to another and be available to medical 
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practitioners. Researchers need to be able to query systems in order to provide 
improved medical treatment, but cannot violate individuals’ privacy. They must do all 
this and more while under constant threat of cyberattack, as recent events have 
shown (Ryckaert, 2018; Woollaston, 2017; Zetter, 2016). Engineers and researchers 
have made significant headway in making medical devices more interoperable with 
one another, particularly when it comes to sharing data securely (Goldman, 2014). 
Increasingly, model-based methods are being used to assess and design medical 
systems (Pajic, Mangharam, Sokolsky, Arney, & Goldman, 2014). The FDA’s 
Sentinel Initiative seeks to enable active querying of medical data while preserving 
individual privacy. All of these endeavors are strikingly similar to the challenges 
currently faced in defense acquisition. This suggests possible benefit in conducting a 
systematic comparison of the two fields. The healthcare industry, along with other 
fields, will be examined for potential metaphors and lessons learned that are 
applicable to understanding vulnerabilities in MCE environments. 
Case Study Applications 
Several organizations (e.g., SRPO, NAVAIR, the US Air Force, and JPL’s 
Team X) are actively developing, testing, and applying MCE practices on their 
programs. A desired future activity is using the CEM process and/or the Reference 
CEM for the purpose of testing these in real-world contexts. This would enable 
gathering additional data that could contribute to a more detailed and robust 
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Conclusions  
Acquisition programs increasingly use model-centric approaches, generating 
and using digital assets throughout the lifecycle. Model-centric practices have 
matured, yet in spite of sound practices there are uncertainties that may impact 
programs over time. The emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, 
disruptive technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related 
programmatic decisions (e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to 
cascading vulnerabilities within model-centric acquisition programs, potentially 
jeopardizing program success.  Ongoing research has led to a preliminary 
Reference CEM that aims to provide program managers with a means to assess, 
prioritize and mitigate model-centric vulnerabilities. Usability testing of the reference 
model has shown positive benefits for practical use in assessing vulnerabilities of 
model-centric programs.  
Research outcomes achieved in this effort include empirically-grounded 
vulnerabilities of model-centric programs and a cause-effect mapping reference 
model for identifying vulnerabilities and interventions. Preliminary investigation of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities within model-centric environments uncovered specific 
instances, and confirmed the need for further study. The research outcomes also 
confirm the need to raise awareness of the importance of performing vulnerability 
analysis of model-centric enterprise practices and environments. Failing to uncover 
such vulnerabilities could ultimately jeopardize program success and lead to end-
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Appendix A (Reference CEM) 
This appendix contains detailed information about the Reference CEM.  Refer 
to Reid (2018) for more detailed images and descriptions.    
Table A-1. Reference CEM Events and Descriptions (Part 1 of 4) 
Event Name Event Type Event Description 
Accidental/Malicious 
Data Release 
External Trigger Either accidentally or intentionally, some amount of 
sensitive data involving the program has been released to 
individuals or groups not cleared to access such 
information 
Budget Cut External Trigger Current or projected funding for this program or for the 
organization as a whole is being reduced 
Congressional Scrutiny External Trigger Congress has become increasingly concerned with the 
management or status of this program or of defense 
programs in general 
Cyberattack Attempt External Trigger Some individual or group seeks to disrupt or surveil the 
program using a cyberattack 
Economic Crunch External Trigger Reduced consumption, reduced willingness to lend, 
raising unemployment or other forms of economic 
recession or depression are occurring 
Foreign Actor Action External Trigger A foreign actor has taken some significant action that 
impacts the intended use of the system that the program is 
acquiring 
Hiring Freeze External Trigger The organization has ceased all new hiring for some 
period of time 
List of Approved 
Modeling Software 
Changes 
External Trigger The organization maintains a list of software approved for 
use in programs and has changed (added and/or 




External Trigger Some modeling software used by the program which is 
purchased or licensed from an external provider has 
become more expensive in the upcoming version/renewal 
Modeling Software No 
Longer Supported 
External Trigger The maintainer/developer of some modeling software 
used by the program has ceased issuing updates and/or 
new versions 
Public Scrutiny External Trigger The public and/or news media has become increasingly 
concerned with the management or status of this program 
or of defense programs in general 
Strategic Realignment External Trigger The strategic interests of the client or other stakeholders in 
the program have changed 
Sufficient IP Rights Not 
Acquired in Contract 
External Trigger A previous project with relevant components or systems 
that could be reused did not acquire sufficient intellectual 
property rights to make those components available for 
reuse 
Technological Change External Trigger A significant new technology has been developed or put 
into application that impacts the program in some way 
Unexpected 
Technological Hurtle 
External Trigger During the program, some desired technology either is 
unexpectedly unavailable or is taking an unexpectedly 
long time to develop 
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Table A-2. Reference CEM Events and Descriptions (Part 2 of 4) 
Event Name Event Type Event Description 
Attrition Intermediary 
Event 
Reduction in experienced staff and/or total staff available 
to the program 




The program must now model the system, subsystem, or 
component in a different environment or in a different 
manner than was previously done 




The program must now change the modeling software 
used 
Component Tampering Intermediary 
Event 
A digital or physical component of the system is 





Other individuals or organizations are able to either 
develop countermeasures to the system being acquired or 
developing competing systems 
Current or Future 
Contracts Canceled 
/Avoided by Customer 
Intermediary 
Event 
The program is either cancelled by the client or future 
programs are never initiated 
Delay in Integrating New 
Models into Suite 
Intermediary 
Event 
Increased time is required to integrate a new modeling 
software or model into the MCE environment 
Development Stall Due to 
Lack of Critical Technology 
Intermediary 
Event 
A critical technology for the program is not available and 
there is not means of altering the design to circumvent the 
need for the technology 
Diminished Enterprise 
Model Curation Capability 
Intermediary 
Event 
Reduced ability of the enterprise or program to track, 
integrate, document, and improve the modeling 
environment 
Documentation Tampering Intermediary 
Event 
Documentation of assumptions or other important aspects 
of models is maliciously altered to harm the program 




Among program staff there is a lack of knowledge on a 
particular subject area of relevance to the program 




One or more models in use by the program cannot be 
integrated into the MCE environment and thus remain 
"stove-piped" 




Program staff no longer have the ability to effectively 
understand and vet the models and/or designs provided 
by the contractor 
Inability to Reuse Models 
in Future Projects 
Intermediary 
Event 
Models from previous or current programs are not 
available to be used in future programs 




Models and simulations do not accurately reflect real-





The program and/or MCE environment has become more 
susceptible to cyberattacks 
Increased Testing 
Required by Customer 
Intermediary 
Event 
The client increases the amount of testing required during 
verification to demonstrate system readiness 
Industry Partners Unwilling 
to Share Information 
Intermediary 
Event 
Subcontractors, suppliers, or other members of industry 
are unwilling to share information with the program due to 
concerns that it will be misused or inappropriately shared 
Layoffs/Incentivized 




Staff experienced with the MCE environment or having 
general relevant experience are laid off or incentivized to 
retire 
Less Model Expertise Intermediary 
Event 
Among program staff there is either a reduced total 
amount of experience or reduced average amount of 
experience with the MCE environment 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 45 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Table A-3. Reference CEM Events and Descriptions (Part 3 of 4) 
Event Name Event Type Event Description 
Loss of Historical Data Intermediary 
Event 
Data from current or previous programs has been lost or 
corrupted such that it is unavailable for future reference or 
reuse 
Malicious Insertion Intermediary 
Event 
A new digital or physical object is inserted into the model or 





The current set of requirements do not sufficiently match 
stakeholder needs, either due to a lack of relevant 






Some member of the program staff misunderstands or fails 
to consider one or more of the assumptions underlying the 
model in such a way as to potentially impact the program 
Modeling Tampering Intermediary 
Event 
The models themselves are maliciously altered to harm the 
program 
Needs Change Intermediary 
Event 
The needs of the client stakeholder(s) are changing in a way 
that impacts the program 




A new modeling or simulation software must be created or 
selected (if COTS) and integrated into the MCE environment 
Over-Trust in Model Intermediary 
Event 
One or more members of the program staff trust the current 
state of the model or results of simulation when these do not 





A physical component in the system being acquired is 





The model documentation is missing relevant information or 






The preferred modeling software or system, either due to 
prior experience or particular relevance to the program, is 
unavailable for use in this program 




External pressure, either from the organization, client, or 
other stakeholder, is exerted on the program manager to 
minimize costs, timing, and "bloat." 




Members of the program, organization, or clients have 
reduced confidence in the ability of the MCE environment to 
be able to operate effectively and securely 
Reduced Model Training Intermediary 
Event 
Reduction in training in the use of the MCE environment is 





Time required to effectively use the modeling software is 
increased 
Reduction of "Upkeep" 
and Indirect Costs 
Intermediary 
Event 
Reduction or elimination of "unessential" procedures, tests, 
and personnel. Particularly likely targets include any 
procedures aimed at improving reuse or other programs 
Reputation Harm Intermediary 
Event 
The professional, political, or public reputation of the 
program, organization, or client has become significantly 
harmed 




Software important to the MCE environment goes without 
updates or patches for longer than ideal, resulting in lack of 
capability or security concerns 
Successful Cyberattack Intermediary 
Event 
A cyberattack was not repelled or stopped until after it 
significantly impacted the program 
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Table A-4 Reference CEM Events and Descriptions (Part 4 of 4) 
Event Name Event Type Event Description 
System Design 
Changes to Work 




A critical technology for the program is not available and 
thus the design of the system must be altered in order to 





The program or organization must reevaluate the integrity 
of the MCE environment and/or the system being designed 





Sensitive or otherwise non-public information is either 
intentionally stolen or otherwise made available to those 
uncleared to possess it 
Under-Trust in Model Intermediary 
Event 
One or more members of the program staff do not place do 
not believe the current state of the model or results of 
simulation when these do represent reality to a sufficient 
extent  
Under-Use of Model Intermediary 
Event 
The program does not make full effective use of the MCE 
environment available 
Unnecessary Rework Intermediary 
Event 
Work previously accomplished in the current program or a 






Some modeling bug, error, or other form of inaccuracy 
develops and goes undetected by the model curation staff 
and/or the program 
Weak Security Controls Intermediary 
Event 
No or few security controls are in place to prevent physical 
or virtual security compromises 
Compromised System Terminal 
Event 










The system fails during verification and/or validation, 
prompting redesign to occur or cancellation of the program 
Field Failure Terminal 
Event 
The system passes verification or validation but fails during 
operation 
Loss of Contract Terminal 
Event 






The system does not provide the advantage or superiority 





The system is "over-engineered" and thus more costly 
and/or has reduced performance that should be possible 
System Not Acquired Terminal 
Event 
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